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THE SPIRIT OF BIBLICAL LAW  
THE SPIRIT OF BIBLICAL LAW. By Calum M. Carmichael. Athens, GA: 
University of Georgia Press, 1996. Pp. 238.  
Reviewed by Richard Hiers* 
In The Spirit of Biblical Law, Professor Carmichael** reiterates and 
further applies the distinctive thesis set out in two1 of his earlier books: 
biblical law consists of critical and often cryptic commentary by two later 
“lawgivers” on the activities of the ancestors of humankind and Israel as 
recorded in narrative traditions, whether history, legend, or myth, beginning 
with Genesis and culminating in 2 Kings.2 These lawgivers placed 
themselves in the role of Moses in order to lend weight to their critiques.3 
Carmichael insists that biblical laws were not drafted to address 
contemporary moral or legal issues in “real-life” society, but rather represent 
the lawgivers’ “literary exercise”4 that they undertook with a view to passing 
generally adverse judgment on the deeds of biblical figures of yore and/or the 
narratives regarding them. He believes that it is often possible to account for 
the apparently odd sequence of laws by referring to clusters or sequences of 
events described in earlier biblical narratives.5 Carmichael also identifies 
certain guiding principles or doctrines underlying the lawgivers’ program. 
Sometimes, though he does not say so explicitly, he implies that these 
principles or doctrines inspired the writing of various laws without reference 
to narrative traditions.  
Professor Carmichael swims comfortably against the current of 
mainstream biblical interpretation, and he frequently chastises other scholars 
 * Professor of Religion and Affiliate Professor of Law, University of Florida, Levin College of 
Law. 
 ** Professor of Comparative Literature and Law, Cornell University. 
 1. See CALUM M. CARMICHAEL, LAW AND NARRATIVE IN THE BIBLE: THE EVIDENCE OF THE 
DEUTERONOMIC LAWS AND THE DECALOGUE (1985); CALUM M. CARMICHAEL, THE ORIGINS OF 
BIBLICAL LAW: THE DECALOGUES AND THE BOOK OF THE COVENANT (1992). See also CALUM M. 
CARMICHAEL, WOMEN, LAW, AND THE GENESIS TRADITIONS (1979); CALUM M. CARMICHAEL, LAW, 
LEGEND, AND INCEST IN THE BIBLE: LEVITICUS 18-20 (1997). 
 2. CALUM M. CARMICHAEL, THE SPIRIT OF BIBLICAL LAW 3 (1996). 
 3. Id. at 3, 5, 13, 17. 
 4. “The lawgiver is first and foremost engaged in a literary exercise whose mechanics structure 
the material in a way different from that imagined by [other] modern interpreters. The laws represent 
judgments on literary traditions.” Id. at 26-27. In addition, note where Carmichael refers to the biblical 
writers’ “literary and historical exercise.” Id. at 3. 
 5. See id. at 16, 34, 67, 93, 110. 
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for failing to understand matters as he does.6 He intimates his own critical 
stance by way of cursory statements scattered throughout the book. The 
lawgivers were two in number: the Deuteronomic and the Priestly.7 They 
were contemporaries: neither came before the other.8 Both, Carmichael 
suggests, did their work around the beginning of the exile, ca. 587 B.C.E.,9 but 
did so independently of each other. The Deuteronomic lawgiver composed 
what otherwise is known as the Covenant Code, found in Exodus 20-23.10 
The Priestly lawgiver created what otherwise is known as H, the Holiness 
Code, or Leviticus 17-26.11 Carmichael sets this understanding against what 
he calls the standard or “long-prevailing” theory that biblical law developed 
over a period of centuries through piecemeal accretions intended to address 
real-life contemporary moral or societal problems.12 He contends that the 
standard theory is mistaken because it is impossible to reconstruct the 
historical-social contexts in which, according to that theory, such laws were 
composed.13 Moreover, he suspects that proponents of the standard theory are 
motivated by a desire “to render” the biblical texts “living” in order to show 
biblical norms relevant to issues in their own time.14 
 6. For instance, he criticizes W.F. Albright and Raymond Westbrook for utilizing ancient Near 
Eastern sources to explain problematic biblical texts when he would find adequate solutions within the 
four corners of the Bible itself, id. at 7-8; Johannes Hempel, Arie Noordtzij, Jacob Milgrom, and 
Baruch Levine for assuming that biblical laws such as those found in Leviticus 19 were developed in 
response to real-life, moral and social concerns, id. at 25-26; Martin Noth and Michael Fishbane for 
their “confusion” in reading “rules” such as Leviticus 19:19 “literally,” id. at 51; John van Seters for 
not being “alert” to various purported “links” (or parallels) “between Joseph and Moses,” id. at 219 
n.2; and interpreters who mistakenly undertake to resolve historically the two different accounts of 
Saul’s demise (1 Samuel 31 and 2 Samuel 1) for failing to be “alert to the marvelous subtlety and 
sophistication of biblical literature,” id. at 145-46. 
 7. Carmichael does not indicate whether he considered these “lawgivers” to be individuals or 
schools of interpretation. “Was the work done by an individual, a school of scholars or antiquarians, or 
a scribal guild?” To such questions he states that he can give only “passing attention.” Id. at 9. 
 8. Id. at 50. 
 9. “I tend to think that all biblical law was produced around the time of the exile in 587 B.C.E.” 
Id. at 4. Carmichael seems to leave open the question of whether this production occurred in the period 
immediately preceding the final events of 587 B.C.E., or early in the period of the exile itself. He does 
not indicate whether he thought the lawgiver was situated among the exiles or among those who 
remained in the vicinity of Jerusalem and the former kingdom of Judah. 
 10. Id. at 182 n.7. 
 11. Carmichael once refers to “H – the designation commonly used for Leviticus 17-26 (the 
Holiness Code) or its redactor,” id. at 68, but then designates the author of the “rules” or “laws” set 
down there as the “Priestly lawgiver” or “Priestly writer,” id. at 68-69, 80. 
 12. Id. at 1. 
 13. Id. at 9, 32, 101. 
 14. Id. at 22. Carmichael implies that such motivation would not only be improper but would 
necessarily distort scholarly research. Cf. Krister Stendahl, Biblical Theology, in 1 THE INTERPRETER’S 
DICTIONARY OF THE BIBLE 418-32 (1962). Stendahl submits that the two questions, “What did it 
mean?” and “What does it mean?” are to be kept separate “long enough for the descriptive task to be 
considered in its own right.” Id. at 419. He concludes that “the history of the discipline [of biblical 
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Strangely, Carmichael neither distinguishes between the intentions or 
concerns of the Deuteronomic and the Priestly lawgivers,15 nor suggests that 
one corrected or revised the work of the other. Although he occasionally 
focuses upon the work of one or the other, he often seems to blend or meld 
them into a single entity, “the lawgiver.” Carmichael contends that the 
“lawgiver” or “lawgivers” had before them much of the biblical narrative 
material now found in Genesis through 2 Kings,16 though in some instances, 
narrative tradition was devised by the lawgivers’ contemporaries—if not by 
the lawgivers themselves17—as another way of providing critical 
commentary on biblical ancestors.18 At one point, Carmichael seems to say 
that the lawgivers also had before them numerous laws, many of them dating 
to earlier times.19 However, his general position seems to be that the 
Deuteronomic and Priestly lawgivers created the vast majority (if not all) of 
biblical laws either before or shortly after the beginning of the exile.20 He 
suggests a number of possible reasons for their doing so. 
If the lawgivers were not addressing contemporary issues, what prompted 
their endeavors? Carmichael offers a number of related suggestions. They 
wrote the laws found in Exodus, Leviticus, and Deuteronomy “in order to suit 
their own . . . needs.”21 One of those needs, or perhaps more aptly, purposes 
was to try “to salvage in the form of invented traditions what was being lost 
because of the collapse, actual or imminent, of [Israelite] culture . . .”22 
scholarship] indicates that all types of biblical theology depend on the progress of this descriptive 
biblical theology.” Id. at 421. 
 15. “The Deuteronomic and Priestly writers compiled all the laws in the Pentateuch, and . . . they 
proceeded in identical fashion.” CARMICHAEL, supra note 2, at 27. Carmichael attributes the same 
intent and modus operandi to both lawgivers. Id. at 40. 
 16. Id. at 3, 27. Carmichael notes that much of “the historical record . . . from [David’s] adultery 
[with Bathsheba] to the account of Solomon’s birth, may well be accurate.” Id. at 150. 
 17. “Samuel’s order to slay the Amalekites [1 Samuel 15:3],” Carmichael states, “is based on a 
law that comes to expression in Deuteronomy 25:17-19.” Id. at 146. If so, it would appear that here the 
narrative presupposes prior law. However, in an endnote, Carmichael explains that “[t]his is an 
instance where the formulation of a law and the shaping of a narrative go hand in hand.” Id. at 216 n.6. 
See also where Carmichael suggests that the lawgivers and the redactors of the “narrative sources” 
from Genesis through 2 Kings “overlap in their use of national records” and “proceed in tandem.” Id. 
at 175 n.5. 
 18. Id. at 142-47.  
 19. “I . . . agree with [Martin] Noth that most of the laws found in Deuteronomy would have had 
a prehistory, some going back to Moses and some preceding him.” Id. at 29. 
 20. “All the biblical rules have been filtered through the historical imagination of the 
Deuteronomic and Priestly lawgivers, who linked them to the history known to them.” Id. at 4. Though 
Carmichael here uses the expression “filtered through,” most of his discussion suggests that he intends 
to credit the lawgivers with producing or creating the laws in question themselves. See supra note 9 
and accompanying text. 
 21. CARMICHAEL, supra note 2, at 3. Carmichael does not explain why he omits Numbers, nor 
does he explain here what he thinks the lawgiver’s needs may have been. 
 
 22. Id. at 4. In that case, the lawgiver’s program would have had real-world social relevance after 
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Carmichael insists that he “can give but passing attention” to such “difficult” 
and “important” questions as what “political environment made it desirable 
to produce rules” on the basis of narrative traditions, and “what use” the 
“legal materials” thereby produced might have served.23 Nevertheless, one 
can find his continuing reflections upon such questions throughout the book. 
While insisting that “the lawgivers” were not writing “in response to 
problems in their own time,” Carmichael states that “they took up problems 
that first presented themselves in the biblical narrative history and addressed 
comparable problems that recur in succeeding generations of that history.”24 
His use of the term “problem” implies some underlying moral understanding: 
there would be no “problem” unless someone felt that something was wrong 
with the picture presented in the narratives.25 Carmichael evidently believes 
that the lawgivers were both committed to certain moral norms,26 and 
concerned about such “problems” in their own time. At one point, he 
acknowledges as much: “When the lawgiver sets out a rule he . . . 
presumably expresses a contemporary concern, but like the narrators of 
biblical stories he traces it back to some development in the early history of 
his nation.”27 “Alas,” Carmichael continues, “we have no evidence of what 
such contemporary concerns of each may have been.”28 
Nevertheless, Carmichael seems to recognize a number of contemporary 
concerns that may have prompted lawgivers to write. Under a subsection 
inappropriately captioned “Primogeniture,”29 the author states that “[a] 
customary practice in ancient Israel was for the firstborn [son] to receive a 
double share of his father’s estate.”30 However, he observes that it could 
happen “in a polygamous setup” where a husband might hate the wife who 
gave birth to his firstborn son. In this context, he writes that “the lawgiver is 
all and would not have been merely a “literary exercise.” Cf. supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
 23. CARMICHAEL, supra note 2, at 9. 
 24. Id. at 27. 
 25. “My assumption is that the biblical lawgivers set out to tackle the ethical and legal problems 
they encountered in their reading of these tales.” Id. at 65 (regarding the Priestly lawgiver’s 
disapproval of traditions condoning incestuous relationships). 
 26. “[T]he lawgivers probably identified themselves with [earlier] prophetic guilds, not only 
adopting their method of constructing judgments but also, when judging Israel’s ancestors, taking the 
same religious, moral, and legal perspective.” Id. at 29. Carmichael suggests that the anonymous 
prophet who confronted Ahab (1 Kings 20:35-43) represents such “guilds.” Id. at 28-29. 
 27. Id. at 101. 
 28. Id. at 101. Carmichael offers, as an example, the runaway slave law of Deuteronomy 23:16-
17, but neither traces this law to narrative tradition nor discusses the possibility that it was written in 
response to the “real life” question whether one should return runaway slaves to their owners. See id. 
at 202 n.25. 
 29. “Primogeniture” normally refers to a system of inheritance under which the oldest son 
receives all of his father’s property. 
 30. Id. at 137. 
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disturbed by such a possibility” and, therefore, seeking “to prevent the 
overthrow of a time-hallowed right” proceeded to draft the law now found at 
Deuteronomy 21:15-17.31  
According to Carmichael, a number of other laws derive from “the 
primary concern of the lawgiver . . . that life and death do not in fact impinge 
on each other.”32 Carmichael urges that five of these laws relate to “topics” 
that came to the lawgiver’s “attention through his scrutiny of certain narrative 
traditions”33; however, in these instances, it appears that Carmichael 
understood that the lawgiver’s concern to “keep life and death . . . apart34 was 
prior to his scrutinizing traditions. He notes two other contemporary concerns 
on the part of the lawgivers. First, they encouraged fellow Israelites to 
preserve their national identity35 and “avoid Babylonian ways,”36 which 
would have been a matter of consequence if the lawgivers were writing near 
the beginning of or early into the Babylonian exile. He notes a rather 
different concern toward the end of the book: 
The biblical scribes may well have been acquainted with the Near 
Eastern legal tradition . . . On this assumption, in order to set out a 
distinctive body of Israelite rules, the biblical scribes scrutinized the 
problems and disputes that they found in their own national traditions 
about the patriarchs, about Moses, about the Judges, and about the 
kings.37 
Here, Carmichael seems to suggest that the lawgivers intended to create a 
body of Israelite law in order to distinguish Israel’s own laws from Near 
Eastern laws of which they presumably disapproved. Perhaps Carmichael at 
some point will provide a more coherent account as to what the biblical 
lawgivers intended to accomplish. 
The present book includes an introduction and nine topical chapters, but 
no concluding chapter. The Introduction and first chapter, “Narrative 
Inspired Law,” summarize the author’s general approach and basic thesis 
challenging interpretations more commonly held among biblical scholars. To 
illustrate his thesis, the author urges that the law against mediums and 
wizards in Leviticus 20:6 was based on the story of Judah and Tamar in 
Genesis 38: 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 140.  
 33. Id. at 131. 
 34. Id. at 130. 
 35. Id. at 61. 
 36. Id. at 82. 
 37. Id. at 173. 
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Tamar dresses as a sacred prostitute . . . Her secret aim is to act on 
behalf of her dead husband to obtain seed for him. The resultant rule 
speaks of an Israelite’s prostituting himself in his involvement with 
those who have dealings with the dead.38 
This is the earliest narrative instance of the problem; the lawgiver then 
“targets a full-blown, concrete example of the problem at a later time,” and 
consequently “the rule about mediums and wizards singles out” 
developments during the reign of Manasseh as found in 2 Kings 21:6.39 
Likewise, the slave laws in Exodus 21:2-11 and Deuteronomy 15:12-18 go 
back to the stories about Laban’s cheating Jacob40 as well as the later 
experience of Hebrew slaves in Egypt.41 The first chapter somewhat 
circuitously traces the divorce law of Deuteronomy 24:1-4 back to the 
account of Abraham’s offering of his wife, Sarah, as his “sister” to 
Abimelech, king of Gerar.42 Abraham did so, Carmichael states, “so that she 
will be free to forge for each of them [both Abraham and Moses] a new 
family tie with a member of the Gerar community.”43 He summarizes the 
purpose of the divorce law as follows: “What is being condemned out of 
hand is the release of the woman from a marriage because, for whatever 
reason, the husband anticipates a favor by letting her go to another man.”44 
Chapter Two focuses on “Laws of Leviticus 19.” Carmichael begins with 
a bold statement: “No body of biblical laws is regarded as so representative 
of its spirit as the rules in Leviticus 19 . . .”45 He then devotes several pages 
to discussing his assumptions and methods that contrast with the “standard” 
views of most other interpreters of biblical law.46 In this context, he 
 38. Id. at 4. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Genesis 29, 31. 
 41. See Exodus 12; CARMICHAEL, supra note 2, at 5-6. 
 42. Genesis 20:1-18. 
 43. CARMICHAEL, supra note 2, at 16-17. But see where Carmichael states that Abraham so acted 
because of “the threat” to his life. Id. at 23. “The threat to Abraham, which prompts his plan to let 
Sarah be acquired by one of these [Gerar] males, is also the background for the rule about the 
newlyweds” in Deuteronomy 24:5. Evidently Carmichael was reading Genesis 20 in light of Genesis 
12:11-13. He proposes to demonstrate that the law of Deuteronomy 24:5 follows that of Deuteronomy 
24:1-4 because both were based on the Genesis 20 narrative. Carmichael finds the facts that Abraham 
and Sarah have not yet had a child, and that Abraham’s life was threatened, parallel the concern he 
infers in Deuteronomy 24:5 that a newly married husband might die on the battlefield before the 
couple could have a child. Id. at 23-24. 
 44. Id. at 20. As authority, Carmichael cites late first century B.C.E. Roman law against pandering 
by husbands and concludes: “The biblical lawgiver views the husband as a panderer too, even though 
he uses the institution of divorce as a cover for his pandering.” Id. 
 45. Id. at 25. 
 46. Id. at 25-34. 
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acknowledges that “[to] date, no other interpreter has seen what I claim to see 
in regard to the systematic nature of the links between the laws and the 
narratives.”47 He then takes up, in sequence, those laws found respectively in 
Leviticus 19:3 (fearing48 parents and keeping Sabbaths); 19:4 (idols and 
molten gods); 19:5-10 (peace offerings and gleaning rules); 19:11-12 
(stealing, dealing falsely, lying, swearing falsely, profaning the name of the 
Lord); 19:13 (defrauding, robbing, or withholding wages); 19:14 (cursing the 
deaf and placing stumbling blocks before the blind); 19:15 (unjustly and 
preferentially judging either the weak or the mighty); 19:16 (talebearing, 
standing against a neighbor’s blood); 19:17 (hating one’s brother and not 
rebuking a neighbor); and 19:18 (avenging or bearing a grudge, loving one’s 
neighbor). These laws, Carmichael urges, all derive from stories about the 
patriarch Joseph49 and/or other narratives or traditions that the lawgiver had 
“in focus.”50 
Carmichael could have titled the third chapter, “Laws as Miniature 
Narratives,” more aptly as “Laws about Forbidden Mixtures.” Here he 
analyzes “rules” against various mixtures found in Deuteronomy 22:9-11 and 
Leviticus 19:19. Carmichael contends that other interpreters err by reading 
these rules literally; so read, he states, such laws would have been 
unnecessary because “[p]ractical experience would largely take care of such 
matters.”51 Instead, he believes “that the rules about forbidden mixtures . . . 
represent clever cryptic judgments on specific aspects of patriarchal 
history.”52 For example, he writes: 
P sets down his rule about mixed seed in response to this development 
in Joseph’s family life: among the seventy bodily descendants of 
Jacob are some of mixed seed . . . With Joseph’s contribution from 
 47. Id. at 32. 
 48. Carmichael states at the outset that he prefers to quote from the “King James Authorized 
Version of 1611,” making changes where “called for,” because this translation “is almost always a 
more literal reading of the Hebrew original than any other translation.” Id. at xiii. 
 49. Genesis 37, 39-45. 
 50. Namely, the creation stories and Aaron’s golden, molten calf, CARMICHAEL, supra note 2, at 
36-37; ritual offenses by Aaron’s sons, id. at 37-38; Jacob’s theft of his father’s blessing, id. at 40-44; 
Rachel’s theft of her father’s household gods and Laban’s fraudulent dealings with Jacob, id. at 41-42; 
Esau’s marrying Canaanite women, id. at 44; and various proverbs, id. at 46-47. Carmichael also states 
that proverbs “are often condensed stories,” thereby perhaps intending to explain why the lawgiver 
purportedly drew on proverbs in such instances rather than on narratives in Genesis through 2 Kings. 
Id. at 49. 
 51. Id. at 50. 
 52. Id. at 52. 
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[his Egyptian wife] Asenath, foreign seed is mixed in with the other 
seed.53 
Likewise, Carmichael maintains that “the next rule” (in Leviticus 19:19) 
about garments made of mixed fibers is based on the story of Joseph. 
Pharaoh gave Joseph a garment of linen; whereas Joseph’s coat of many 
colors “played a major role in the . . . loss of an elevated status within his 
family.”54 Moreover, the Egyptians abhorred non-Egyptian nomadic 
shepherds—“the occupation of his brothers.”55 
It follows that the opposition in the Joseph story is between linen as an 
indicator of Egyptian societal status and wool as an indicator of 
Israelite societal status . . . 
P’s alertness to such a conflict of identity is what underlies his 
injunction about a garment of two kinds . . . [H]e prohibits the mixing 
of foreign attire with native in order symbolically to maintain Israelite 
identity uncompromised.56 
In Chapter Four, “Incest in the Bible,” Carmichael grounds his 
interpretation of the incest laws of Leviticus 18 and 20 on “the patriarchs’ 
incestuous involvements.” Thus, Leviticus 18:6-7 (incest with one’s father or 
mother) is based on Genesis 9:20-27 where “Ham looks upon [his father’s] 
nakedness,”57 and Genesis 19:30-38 where “Lot’s daughters uncover their 
father’s nakedness.”58 Carmichael acknowledges here that the lawgivers do 
not so much condemn the patriarchal conduct, but rather “bring out 
analogous conduct”: “The relationship between the law and the narrative is 
not a slavish one-to-one correspondence.”59 He then analyzes the incest laws 
found in Leviticus 18:8-18, linking them with narratives about Reuben’s 
incest with Jacob’s wife; Abraham’s marriage to his half-sister, Sarah; the 
episode of Lot and his daughters (again)60; the story of Judah and Tamar; and 
 53. Id. at 56-57. 
 54. Id. at 58. 
 55. Id. at 58-59. 
 56. Id. at 59. The author does not explain how a law against wearing a garment made of two 
kinds of fiber would be understood to symbolize a garment made from one fiber as opposed to a 
different garment made from another fiber. 
 57. Carmichael considers looking upon as equivalent to uncovering Noah’s nakedness, thus 
constituting incest. Strangely, he adds that Noah subsequently “curses Ham to a life of enslavement to 
his brothers.” Id. at 68. The biblical text states that Noah cursed Canaan. 
 58. Id. at 68-69. 
 59. Id. at 70. 
 60. He proposes that this episode somehow is the basis for the prohibition against a man’s sexual 
relationship with his granddaughters. See id. at 74-75. 
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Jacob’s marriage to the two sisters, Rachel and Leah. 
Chapter Five traces the entire Decalogue to the story of the golden calf in 
Exodus 32 and the early traditions about Adam and Eve and Cain and Abel in 
Genesis 2-4. Carmichael believes that the sequence of commandments found 
in “the second tablet” can be explained thereby. For instance, the 
commandment about honoring parents follows the laws based on the golden 
calf episode because both involve procreation.61 The fact that a mark was put 
on Cain so that nobody would kill him prompted the law “Thou shalt not 
murder.”62 In addition, Cain’s marriage63 prompted the lawgiver to write 
“Thou shalt not commit adultery” in order to protect “the institution of 
marriage” as well as “the order of creation,” namely, “the original unity of 
man and woman.”64 The author notes that the Exodus and Deuteronomic 
versions of the Decalogue65 are sometimes different,66 but does not explain 
how or why the Priestly and Deuteronomic lawgivers, still presumably 
working independently, would have produced such similar sets of rules.67 
Chapter Six, entitled “An Eye for an Eye, and a Tooth for a Tooth: The 
History of a Formula,” considers the meaning of the lex talionis. According 
to Carmichael, the “universally” held view is that the versions in Exodus 
21:22-25 (injury to a pregnant woman) and Deuteronomy 19:16-21 
(malicious, false, incriminating testimony) refer to “retaliation in kind 
depending on the offense . . .”68 Carmichael proposes that “the formula 
means exactly what it says,” namely, capital punishment “to be followed by 
the systematic mutilation of the offender’s corpse.”69 The Deuteronomic 
version, as a matter of “fact,” he writes, derives from the lawgiver’s “focus” 
 61. “The lawgiver notes that only by producing children do humans approach the creative powers 
of God. That is why he turns to the topic of honoring parents . . .” Id. at 93. “Procreation plays a major 
role in the incident involving the golden calf.” Id. 
 62. Id. at 95-96. 
 63. Genesis 4:17. 
 64. CARMICHAEL, supra note 2, at 96. Carmichael introduces this conclusion as follows: “At the 
mythical level, . . . when Cain marries he reaches into his own body, so to speak, to do so. Future 
interference with such a union—for example, when a man has sex with another man’s wife—is an 
offense against the created order.” Id. He continues, “[n]o adultery is committed in the Genesis 
narrative, but one must recall that there is no direct correspondence between narratives and the laws 
derived from them.” Id. 
 65. Exodus 20:2-17; Deuteronomy 5:6-21. 
 66. CARMICHAEL, supra note 2, at 87-89, 95. 
 67. See where Carmichael refers to “[e]ach of the authors of the two versions of the Decalogue in 
Exodus and Deuteronomy...” Id. at 87. Oddly, however, Carmichael generally attributes the Decalogue 
to “the lawgiver,” as if “he” had been a single person. Id. at 87, 92-94, 96-97, 99-101, 104. Elsewhere, 
he attributes it to a single “scribal school.” Id. at 102. 
 68. Id. at 106. 
 69. Id. at 107. 
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on “the trial of Naboth in 1 Kings 21.”70 On the other hand, the Priestly 
lawgiver “stands opposed to the intensified death penalty” and so, in 
Leviticus 24:19-20, separates the death penalty for homicide from various 
types of non-capital punishment-in-kind for mayhem.71 
Chapter Seven, “Life/Death,” argues that many laws derive from the 
lawgiver’s conviction that life and death should be kept separate. This rather 
abstract principle explains various laws such as the “command to dedicate 
the first fruits and the prohibition against cooking a kid in its mother’s 
milk”72; the laws against certain mourning practices and not eating “an 
animal that died a natural death”73; the absolution ceremony to be observed 
when a man has been murdered by person or persons unknown74; the “law of 
the captive woman”75; the law protecting the first born son’s inheritance 
rights76; and the “incorrigible son” and “hanging corpse” laws.77 
Carmichael entitles the two final chapters “Law in the Narratives,” with 
Chapter Eight subtitled “Retribution” and Chapter Nine subtitled “Dispute 
Resolution.” In both chapters, Carmichael contends that the biblical 
narrators, like the biblical lawgivers, pass judgment upon earlier figures in 
the biblical history, creating new episodes in accordance with their own 
predilections. 
In Chapter Eight, the author reviews the accounts of Saul’s death in 1 
Samuel 31 and 2 Samuel 1, and the story of David’s adultery with 
Bathsheba78 and its aftermath: Uriah’s death, Nathan’s parable, and the 
course of events in the lives of David’s offspring, Amnon, Tamar, and 
Absalom. In both sets of narratives, Carmichael proposes that the offenses of 
the respective protagonists were met with appropriate, dire consequences 
because the narrator was committed to the proposition that “inscrutable 
providential governance requires that every wrongdoing receives its ultimate 
just desert.”79 Thus, Carmichael claims that Saul’s suicide “mirrors” his 
 70. Id. at 109. 
 71. Id. at 120. 
 72. Exodus 23:19, 34:26; Deuteronomy 14:21. 
 73. Deuteronomy 14:1, 21. 
 74. Deuteronomy 21:1-9. 
 75. Deuteronomy 21:10-14. 
 76. Deuteronomy 21:15-17. 
 77. Deuteronomy 21:18-21, 22-23. 
 78. 2 Samuel 11. 
 79. CARMICHAEL, supra note 2, at 148. The doctrine that, in this life, individuals experience 
retribution for their misdeeds is rarely found in pre- or early exilic writings. As authority for this 
doctrine in the time of the present narrator, Carmichael cites 1 Chronicles 10:13-14, id. at 148, and 
Deuteronomy 28, id. at 150. 1 Chronicles and 2 Chronicles, however, are generally dated no earlier 
than the middle of the fifth century or as late as the fourth century B.C.E. Deuteronomy 28 rather 
clearly refers to the fate of Israel as a whole and not to that of individuals. 
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“interference in the realm of death,” namely, his consultation of the medium 
at Endor, which was “a misdeed deserving death.”80 Carmichael states that 
the account of Saul’s death in 2 Samuel 1 relates back to Saul’s failure to 
massacre the Amalekite king Agag, as ordered by the prophet Samuel. “The 
report of Saul’s death in 2 Samuel 1 . . . concentrates on Saul’s disobedience 
to the law81 calling for the total extermination of the Amalekites.”82 Likewise, 
in the aftermath of David’s adultery with Bashsheba, Carmichael asserts that 
“[t]he inscrutable workings of providence visit a mirroring retribution on the 
offender, and [the] members of [David’s] family are but instruments in 
heaven’s hands to accomplish [this] retribution.”83 While Carmichael credits 
the narratives about Saul’s and David’s offenses and subsequent instances of 
retribution for their “marvelously subtle mirroring character,”84 he 
nevertheless disapproves of the narrator’s fictive theology of retribution: 
Alas, in interpreting the events of this story, the ancient writer(s) 
presents a view of justice that is profoundly unsatisfactory . . . The 
[writer’s] craving for justice reveals right values, rises to the heights in 
suggesting a unified view of all human action but also depicts justice 
as cold, impersonal, and antihuman.85 
Carmichael, like the biblical lawgivers and narrators before him, 
evidently is prepared to review and pass moral (or aesthetic) judgment on the 
biblical history or story. 
In Chapter Nine, the author recounts various “links” or parallels between 
the story of Joseph in Genesis and that of Moses in Exodus. Both undertake 
“to rescue their fellow Hebrews from hardship”; Moses “is saved from the 
river” by a foreigner while Joseph is saved from a pit “by a group of 
foreigners,” with each ending up as “a member” of an Egyptian household.86 
More significantly, the narrator, like the lawgiver, critiques the biblical 
ancestors. For instance, by presenting “the deity’s . . . open and honest” and 
“eminently fair” action in providing manna to “Israelite families at their time 
of need,”87 the narrator implicitly condemns Joseph’s “underhandedness 
 80. Id. at 147. 
 81. Deuteronomy 25:17-19. 
 82. CARMICHAEL, supra note 2, at 146. There is no reference to this law in 2 Samuel 1. 
 83. Id. at 156. “The historical fact that David got away with his act of adultery and elimination of 
Uriah no doubt determined the narrator’s quest for other ways to suggest that wrongdoing meets with 
its just deserts.” Id. at 160. 
 84. Id. at 143. 
 85. Id. at 160. 
 86. Id. at 163. 
 87. Id. at 166. Carmichael also proposes that the law regarding false weights and measures 
(Deuteronomy 25:13-16) was inspired by the lawgiver’s observing the contrast between “Joseph’s 
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while providing his family with grain in their time of need.”88 Likewise, the 
story of Moses’ establishment of a judicial system in Exodus 18 constitutes a 
judgement upon Joseph’s “sham resolution” of the dispute with his 
brothers89: “[T]he biblical writer perceived a need to respond to the 
unsatisfactory way that justice had been dispensed among the first sons of 
Israel.”90 
Many years ago, in his presidential address at the Society of Biblical 
Literature, Professor Samuel Sandmel cautioned against what he called 
“parallelomania,” or looking for, and then discovering purportedly, parallel 
biblical passages on the basis of only slight or imagined similarities: 
The key word in my essay is extravagance. I am not denying that 
literary parallels and literary influence, in the form of source and 
derivation, exist. I am not seeking to discourage the study of these 
parallels, but, especially in the case of the Qumran documents, to 
encourage them. However, I am speaking words of caution about 
exaggerations about the parallels and about source and derivation.91 
Those who read The Spirit of Biblical Law certainly will judge for 
themselves whether or to what extent Professor Carmichael has demonstrated 
probable, or at least plausible, links or parallels between certain biblical 
narratives and biblical laws. In a number of instances, he undoubtedly has 
done so. 
Several of Carmichael’s suggestions as to such connections are both 
imaginative and persuasive. For example, he proposes that in Leviticus 18:15, 
“[t]he lawgiver sets down his rule against a sexual relationship with a 
daughter-in-law in response to Judah’s dealings with Tamar” in Genesis 38.92 
He suggests that the incident involving the golden calf “inspired the (first 
tablet of the) Decalogue” by drawing attention to the parallel between the 
apostate Israelites’ claim that their idol “brought [them] up out of the land of 
deceptive transaction” and “the deity providing manna . . .” Id. at 172. Here, as often happens 
throughout the book, Carmichael cites to his writings “elsewhere” rather than to primary textual 
evidence. 
 88. Exodus 16. 
 89. CARMICHAEL, supra note 2, at 170. 
 90. Id. at 171. 
 91. Samuel Sandmel, Parallelomania, 81 J. OF BIBLICAL LITERATURE 1 (1962). 
 92. CARMICHAEL, supra note 2, at 77. Carmichael concedes that, at the time, Tamar “is not 
actually married to any of Judah’s sons,” but explains, somewhat less persuasively, that she is 
nevertheless “affianced to [the surviving third son] by the custom of levirate marriage.” Cf. supra text 
accompanying note 38 (proposing that the Judah-Tamar story inspired Leviticus 20:6, the law against 
mediums and wizards). 
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Egypt,”93 and the preamble to the Decalogue which [in the version in Exodus 
20:2] affirms that it was Yahweh that “brought [them] out of the land of 
Egypt . . .”94 In support of this theory that the lex talionis called for the 
mutilation of executed criminals’ corpses, Carmichael cites 2 Samuel 4:12, 
which reports David’s ordering not only the execution of Ishbosheth’s 
assassins, but also the subsequent amputation of their hands and feet.95  
On the other hand, many of the links or parallels that Carmichael 
discovers are far from obvious. He bases several upon his own 
characterization of a given narrative situation or its purported legal 
counterpart. Thus, he links the “rule about newlyweds” in Deuteronomy 24:5 
to the story of Abraham, Sarah, and Abimelech in Genesis 20 through the 
term threat that appears in neither text.96 He proposes that the Decalogue’s 
requirement of honoring parents was “a response to Cain’s act of dishonoring 
his parents by killing their son, Abel . . .”97 He also claims that the law of 
Leviticus 19:14 against cursing the deaf derived from Jacob’s and Rebekah’s 
collaboration in connection with Jacob obtaining his brother Esau’s blessing: 
“Isaac is the victim of his wife’s eavesdropping”; moreover, “the lawgiver 
could find in Jacob’s lie an example of someone abusing another’s sense of 
hearing.”98  
In other instances, Carmichael asserts the existence of connections or 
links between law and narrative where there is no apparent textual basis for 
doing so. For instance, the gleaning law of Deuteronomy 24:19-22 
“commemorates Joseph’s experience” in that he was elevated to power “only 
after he is forgotten in prison by the butler whose dreams he interprets”; thus 
“[h]e is like the forgotten sheaf in the Deuteronomic law: if the harvester 
remembers the sheaf, he gives it to the sojourner, the widow, and the orphan 
. . .”99 In another instance, Carmichael asserts that the “law of the disobedient 
 93. Exodus 32:4. 
 94. CARMICHAEL, supra note 2, at 86. 
 95. Id. at 107. Carmichael does not cite any instances of “eye for eye” or “tooth for tooth.” If the 
lex talionis was intended to specify post-execution mutilation, it is odd that it should have called for 
“eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot” unless the offender had injured a victim’s 
eye, tooth, hand, or foot. 
 96. See supra note 43. 
 97. CARMICHAEL, supra note 2, at 35 (emphasis added). 
 98. Id. at 43 (emphasis added). There is nothing about cursing the deaf in the Jacob-Rebekah-
Isaac story. 
 99. Id. at 39. It is doubtful whether this allegorical mode of interpretation can be properly 
ascribed to sixth century B.C.E. “lawgivers.” It may be significant that Carmichael occasionally cites 
Philo of Alexandria as authority. See, e.g., id. at 93, 181 n.22, 198 n.42, 199 n.1. Here Carmichael 
makes a connection on the basis of catchwords: the forgotten sheaf of Deuteronomy 25:19, Joseph’s 
sheaves dream of Genesis 37:5-7, and Pharaoh’s chief butler’s having temporarily forgotten Joseph 
after being released from prison (Genesis 40:23). The Deuteronomic law refers not only to sheaves of 
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son”100 was based upon the lawgiver’s consideration of the wrongful hostility 
directed at Esau on account of Rebekah’s favoritism toward Jacob. “The 
lawgiver examines the situation to see if there might ever be grounds for 
treating someone like Esau as not worthy of the right of the firstborn son.”101 
Or, again, his claim that the laws of Leviticus 24 were meant to apply equally 
to Israelites and foreigners because Jezebel was a foreigner.102 Many other 
links or parallels that the author points to are at best speculative or obscure.103  
Professor Carmichael acknowledges that the lawgivers’ procedure is often 
not only subtle and sophisticated, but also cryptic,104 and that laws 
sometimes, if not typically, do not deal directly with the problems or issues 
perceived in the narratives.105 Yet he often exaggerates the nature of the 
connections, links, or parallels he sees, using such expressions as “strikingly 
similar,”106 “central in,”107 “compelling evidence,”108 a “striking” feature in 
common,109 “a pronounced parallel,”110 or “a startling[ly]” “similar” 
“element,”111 while lamenting other interpreters’ confusion or blindness as to 
grain, but also to olives and grapes, all of which are to benefit sojourners, widows, and orphans. The 
story of Joseph’s dream about sheaves anticipates his future power over his brothers, and its tactless 
recitation accounts in part for their hostility toward him. There is nothing in the Joseph story about 
Joseph’s being given “to the sojourner, the widow, and the orphan.” 
 100. Deuteronomy 21:18-21. 
 101. CARMICHAEL, supra note 2, at 132. Nothing in the Esau-Rebekah-Jacob story suggests that 
Esau had been stubborn or rebellious, or that either of his parents ever contemplated putting him to 
death; and nothing in Deuteronomy 21:18-21 refers to a firstborn son or in any other way to “someone 
like Esau.” 
 102. Id. at 121-22. Leviticus 24:22 requiring “one law for the sojourner and for the native” is set in 
the context of the story about a man of mixed Israelite and Egyptian parentage who had “blasphemed 
the Name and cursed” (Leviticus 24:10-23). Blasphemy is not mentioned among Jezebel’s other 
offenses. Carmichael suggests that the “rule about homicide in Leviticus 24:17 . . . could have come 
from the legislator’s taking stock of Naboth’s demise for his alleged blasphemy.” Id. at 119. Laws 
requiring equal protection under the law for sojourners or resident aliens are to be found in several 
other contexts. See, e.g., Exodus 12:49, Numbers 9:14, Numbers 15:15, Numbers 16, Numbers 29. 
Leviticus 24:22 refers to sojourners or resident aliens.  
 103. For example, his claims that the slave laws of Exodus 21:2-11 and Deuteronomy 15:12-18 are 
based on the Jacob-Laban story, CARMICHAEL, supra note 2, at 4-6; that the law allowing eating a 
neighbor’s grapes or plucking his grain (Deuteronomy 23:24-25) was triggered by the lawgiver’s 
reflection upon the Edomites’ refusal (described in Numbers 20:14-21) to allow the Israelites to pass 
through their territory, during which time they might have wished to pick grapes or grain, id. at 13-16. 
Carmichael concedes that the Numbers narrative does not “bring up the possibility of [the Israelites’] 
eating and paying for Edomite grain or grapes.” Id. at 14. For other instances of highly speculative or 
obscure links or parallels, see supra notes 38, 42, 43-44, 56-64, 87 and accompanying text. 
 104. See id. at 9, 52. See also id. 143, 146 (regarding the narrators). 
 105. See supra note 64 and text accompanying note 59. 
 106. CARMICHAEL, supra note 2, at 29. 
 107. Id. at 47. 
 108. Id. at 109. 
 109. Id. at 132. 
 110. Id. at 136.  
 111. Id. 
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what he sees.112 
Carmichael may well be correct in concluding that at least some biblical 
laws reflect their drafters’ familiarity with and recollection of traditional 
narratives about earlier figures. However, he could strengthen his case if he 
both focused on texts where links or parallels between narrative and law are 
more visible and refrained from making extravagant or exaggerated 
assertions or claims where there is little or no supporting evidence. It may be 
that the biblical lawgivers were engaged in writing critical commentaries on 
the conduct of Israel’s forebears. On the other hand, Carmichael’s a priori 
hypothesis, which is that the biblical lawgivers were so detached from their 
times that they lacked interest in contemporary real life problems or 
concerns, seems highly implausible. 
Carmichael concedes that at least some laws may have been prompted by 
interest in contemporary concerns.113 However, he professes, we can know 
nothing about the historical circumstances that give rise to such concerns.114 
From this profession of ignorance, however, he proceeds to the odd 
conclusion that the lawgivers were not writing about contemporary concerns 
after all, but rather commenting on their ancestors as represented in the early 
narrative traditions.115 It would seem more plausible simply to conclude that 
biblical laws refer to the kinds of situations they address, whether or not one 
can reconstruct the particular historical setting in which they were set down. 
It would be extraordinary if Israel and Judah, unlike all other communities in 
the ancient and modern world, failed to develop a series of laws dealing with 
recurrent or anticipated moral and societal issues. 
One final critical point: it is not at all clear why Carmichael entitled this 
book The Spirit of Biblical Law. The expression appears only twice in the 
entire book. Chapter Two begins with the statement: “No body of biblical 
laws is regarded as so representative of its spirit as the rules in Leviticus 19, 
one of which is the rule to love one’s neighbor as oneself.”116 However, 
 112. See id. at 50-51, 113. See also supra note 6. 
113. See CARMICHAEL, supra note 2, at 101, quoted in supra text accompanying note 27. See 
also text accompanying notes 29-37. 
114. “I do not believe that the biblical text provides sufficient evidence to support historical 
reconstructions.” Id. at 32. See also id. at 9, 101. 
115. See where, in regard to Deuteronomy 22:22 (a man found lying with another’s wife), 
Carmichael writes: “We cannot tell from a reading of the law itself what is going on. We have to 
assume that the law was composed with the narrative about Abraham and Sarah specifically under 
review.” Id. at 19. It seems more plausible to assume that this law had to do with the kind of situation 
where a man was found lying with another’s wife. Likewise, the runaway slave law of Deuteronomy 
23:16-17 arguably had to do with the question whether runaway slaves should be returned to their 
former owners. See id. at 101; supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
116. Id. at 25. 
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scholars who hold this view, or who assume “that the material in Leviticus 
19 reflects the living reality of ancient Israelite society,” misunderstand “the 
nature of the material they are interpreting.”117 Elsewhere, he states that 
“readers of the Bible have [long] regarded the Decalogue as enshrining the 
spirit of biblical law.”118 However, he then proceeds to urge that modern 
interpreters who think along such lines likewise are mistaken.119 Carmichael 
appears to imply that there is or was no “spirit of biblical law.” Perhaps he 
would have shed more light on this matter had he written a concluding 
chapter.
 117. Id. at 25-26. 
 118. Id. at 83. 
 119. Id.  
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